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This article presents a republican interpretation of Michael Walzer’s 
theory of distributive justice and of his idea of complex equality. It dem-
onstrates that Spheres of Justice is not only a defense of pluralism and 
equality (as the subtitle announces), but also of liberty or freedom. Like 
Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, Walzer understands liberty as non-
domination. For Walzer, a just distribution of all social goods leads to a 
“complex egalitarian society” in which every citizen is equally free from 
domination and tyranny. Against alternative interpretations, this paper 
suggests that Walzer is indeed a political egalitarian and that complex 
equality should be interpreted as a simple equality of liberty or freedom. 
In the conclusion, the article argues that Walzer’s and Pettit’s versions of 
republicanism are complementary because they each illuminate the oth-
er’s blind spot and thus mutually fi x each other’s particular shortcoming.
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1. Rawls and Walzer
Almost 50 years have passed since John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice 
was published in 1971.1 This infl uential work, in which Rawls tries to 
substantiate two principles of justice for social institutions, has led to 
a true renaissance of normative political philosophy. Still today, his 
theory “dominates contemporary debates, not because everyone accepts 
1 In the fi rst months of 1975 Rawls added some changes and improvements in 
his work for the German Edition which came out in 1979. This version was not 
published in English until 1999.
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it, but because alternative views are often presented as responses to it” 
(Kymlicka 2002: 10). In some ways this is also true for Michael Wal-
zer’s groundbreaking work Spheres of Justice, which came out in 1983. 
Though Walzer contends that his “enterprise is very different from Raw-
ls’s,” he admits that it “would not have taken shape as it did—it might 
not have taken shape at all—without his work” (Walzer 1983: xviii).
In the preface of the German edition of Spheres, Walzer explains 
what he holds to be the main difference between his and Rawls’s the-
ory. According to Rawls, his two principles of justice are suffi cient to 
regulate the distribution of all desirable social goods, like liberty, op-
portunity, income and offi ces. Against this claim, Walzer argues that 
the broad range of different social goods—membership, welfare, secu-
rity, free time, education, recognition, political power, etc.—cannot be 
reduced to “a short list of basic goods,” and neither are two principles of 
justice suffi cient to regulate the just distribution of all these social goods 
(Walzer 1983: 4; Walzer 1992: 12). Rather, Walzer calls for a diverse 
set of rules, standards and principles for the distribution of all different 
social goods. While “from Plato onward,” the majority of philosophers 
who have written about justice assume that “there is one, and only 
one, distributive system,” Walzer argues for a pluralist approach that 
encompasses a variety of distributions and distributive principles. He 
claims “that the principles of justice are themselves pluralist in form; 
that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, 
in accordance with different procedures, by different agents” (Walzer 
1983: 5–6). For him, there is only one universal procedural rule: each 
social good should be distributed according to the criteria valid for its 
own sphere (Walzer 1992: 12).
Walzer’s main suggestion for the multiplicity of social goods and 
the complexity of distributive systems is his idea of “complex equality”. 
This remarkable idea reconciles the common egalitarian demand for 
social equality with the recognition of a large number of social inequal-
ities. Walzer distinguishes the political egalitarianism he advocates 
from the prevailing egalitarian approaches that aim at establishing 
“simple equality” (Walzer 1983: 13–17). Simple egalitarians usually 
focus on one social good, like resources or welfare, and argue that this 
good should be redistributed towards the goal that everyone has the 
same amount of this good.2 Contrary to this, Walzer’s claim for “com-
plex equality” permits unequal distributions of social and economic 
2 In his fi rst two articles on equality Ronald Dworkin focuses on the problem of 
“distributional equality”, which does not concern the distribution of political power 
but of money and other resources to individuals (Dworkin 1981a, 1981b): “I shall 
consider two general theories of distributional equality. The fi rst (which I shall call 
equality of welfare) holds that a distributional scheme treats people as equals when 
it distributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer would 
leave them more equal in welfare. The second (equality of resources) holds that it 
treats them as equals when it distributes or transfers so that no further transfer 
would leave their shares of the total resources more equal” (Dworkin 2001: 12).
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goods if these goods are distributed under certain conditions. This is 
also true for Rawls’s difference principle which allows social and eco-
nomic inequalities if they are to the greatest benefi t of the least advan-
taged members of society.3
In a just society that Walzer conceptualizes as a “complex egalitar-
ian society” (Walzer 1983: 17, 320), most goods are distributed une-
qually. This raises the questions why Walzer sees himself as a political 
egalitarian at all and why he calls such a society an “egalitarian soci-
ety.” What exactly does his idea of “complex equality” mean and what 
kind of equality does the term refer to? In the literature on Walzer, 
some interpretations of “complex equality” have been offered (Arneson 
1995, Haus 2000, Miller 1995b, Swift 1995). Though grasping some 
important aspects of Walzer’s idea, however, these approaches seem 
to miss his main point. The proposal here is for a different reading of 
Walzer’s “theory of complex equality” (Walzer 1983: 28), an interpreta-
tion that might be surprising. As its main thesis, this paper suggests 
that complex equality should be interpreted as an equality of freedom 
or liberty. Contrary to John Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness 
that demands primarily equal liberty, the idea and value of liberty 
seems to be of no signifi cant importance in Michael Walzer’s norma-
tive theory of justice. In Spheres, the terms “liberty” and “freedom” are 
mentioned only a few times, and the subtitle announces merely A De-
fense of Pluralism and Equality. Despite these facts, this paper aims to 
show that liberty and freedom play a key role in Walzer’s theory of jus-
tice. Like proponents of contemporary republicanism, Walzer under-
stands liberty primarily in terms of a state that protects all citizens in 
a reliable way from domination. Such an understanding, which defi nes 
liberty as non-domination, was elaborated by Quentin Skinner, and in 
particular by Philip Pettit in his two books Republicanism: A Theory of 
Freedom and Government (1997), and On the People’s Terms. A Repub-
lican Theory and Model of Democracy (2012). A detailed consideration 
of Walzer’s “complex equality” from the perspective of Pettit’s republi-
canism leads to a better understanding of this idea.
Walzer himself makes clear that he is in favor of a republicanism 
that is adapted to the pluralism of civil society. Such a “pluralist re-
publicanism,” he suggests, “is also likely to advance the prospects of 
what I called ‘complex equality’” (Walzer 2005b: 178, cf. 160–161; cf. 
Walzer 2007b: 116–120). However, usually Walzer refers to himself as 
a democratic socialist (Walzer 1980).4 In the literature, he is most com-
monly described as a communitarian (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 7, 
3 The fi nal statement of the difference principle in A Theory of Justice reads: 
“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are […] (a) to the 
greatest benefi t of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle” 
(Rawls 1971: 302).
4 In Spheres, Walzer states that the appropriate “institutional arrangement” 
for complex equality in “our own society” is a “decentralized democratic socialism” 
(Walzer 1983: 318).
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10; Benbaji and Sussman 2014: 2; Kymlicka 2002: 209; Reiner 2011. 
Yet for his book Politics and Passion Walzer chose the subtitle Toward 
a more Egalitarian Liberalism (Walzer 2005a).5 In line with this sub-
title, David Miller declares in the introduction of a book he edited with 
Walzer’s articles: “Politically, Walzer is a liberal” (Walzer 2007a: xi–
xii). There are good reasons for the claim that all these labels fi t Walz-
er to some extent. Nevertheless, his idea of complex equality is most 
adequately understood through the lens of the neo-republican ideal of 
non-domination.
Section Two of this paper lays out Philip Pettit’s account of the re-
publican tradition, and in particular his understanding of liberty as 
non-domination, and its relation to his egalitarian theory of social jus-
tice. Section Three shows that Walzer has a very similar understand-
ing of liberty as the opposite of domination. This section also points out 
how Walzer’s concept of liberty relates to his political egalitarianism 
and how the latter differs from the simple egalitarianism he criticizes. 
Section Four explains Walzer’s ideal of an autonomous distribution of 
all social goods and gives a preliminary analysis of his idea of “complex 
equality.” Section Five demonstrates that Walzer conceives of complex 
equality as simple equality of liberty or freedom. In a “complex egalitar-
ian society,” every citizen is equally free from domination and tyranny. 
The conclusion contains a critique of both Walzer and Pettit. However, 
it argues that the two forms of republicanism are complementary be-
cause they each illuminate the other’s blind spot and thus mutually fi x 
each other’s particular shortcoming.
2. The Republican Understanding of the Relation 
of Liberty, Equality and Social Justice
Philip Pettit understands his work as part of a growing number of con-
tributions to political theory that is oriented towards a republican ideal 
or the republican tradition of thought.6 For Pettit, the recent republi-
can movement began with Quentin Skinner’s historical research on the 
Medieval foundations of modern political thought and his articles on 
Machiavelli, along with the works of others who write within a repub-
lican tradition identifi ed as such by John Pocock (Pocock 1975, Skinner 
1990: 293–309, 1998, 2002: 186–212. The latter essay also contains a 
critique of Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative liberty.). This tradition, 
which Pettit calls the “Italian-Atlantic,” starts historically in Rome 
with Polybius, Cicero and Titus Livius. Leading Italian thinkers of the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance—especially “‘the divine Machiavel’ 
5 In this book, Walzer explicitly sticks to the view he had already pronounced 
1990 in his article “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.” According to 
his summary of this view, communitarianism is not “a freestanding doctrine or 
substantive political program” but “a corrective to liberal theory and practice” 
(Walzer 2005a: x; cf. Walzer 2005b).
6 Cf. Pettit’s list of contributions (Pettit 2012: 3 fn. 1).
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of the Discourses”—base their work on these Roman scholars (Pettit 
1997: 5, 2012: 6). In the Anglo-Saxon region, the republican tradition 
was continued by James Harrington, John Milton and Algernon Sid-
ney, in France by Montesquieu.
Rousseau, on the contrary, constitutes, for Pettit, the beginning of 
the communitarian tradition that he regards as a continental form of 
republicanism in the broad sense. Pettit differentiates this form of re-
publicanism from the Italian-Atlantic tradition (Pettit 2012: 11–12). 
On the one hand, Rousseau maintains one feature of the Italian-At-
lantic tradition, the understanding of liberty as non-domination, while 
on the other, he breaks with this tradition by arguing against the two 
other features it holds to be characteristic for a republic: a mixed con-
stitution and a contestatory citizenry:
The mixed constitution was meant to guarantee a rule of law—a constitu-
tional order—under which each citizen would be equal with others and a 
separation and sharing of powers—a mixed order—that would deny control 
over the law to any one individual or body. The contestatory citizenry was 
the civic complement to this constitutional ideal: it was to be a citizenry 
committed to interrogating all the elements of government and imposing 
itself in the determination of law and policy. (Pettit 2012: 5)
In order to check the government and be vigilant, the citizens need in-
dividual and collective virtue. A contestatory citizenry and a function-
ing mixed constitution can protect all citizens from domination and, 
thus, protect their liberty (Pettit 2012: 5).
For Pettit, the new perspective that the republican tradition opens 
up on contemporary politics is mainly indebted to the innovative un-
derstanding of liberty as non-domination that goes back to Roman 
thought. However, this understanding was obscured by the liberal 
comprehension of liberty as non-interference, starting with the debates 
around the American Revolution. In line with this, republicanism was 
substituted by liberalism as the prevailing political philosophy (Pettit 
1997: 12). Liberty as non-interference is identical with what, in Two 
Concepts of Liberty, Isaiah Berlin calls “negative liberty.” Berlin marks 
“negative liberty” off from “positive liberty” (Berlin 1958). Compared 
with this distinction, Pettit’s concept of liberty as non-domination, 
which goes back to Skinner, is as a third possibility.
For Berlin, “negative liberty” means the absence of interference—I 
am negatively free “to the degree to which no human being interferes 
with my activity” and to the degree that I can make uncoerced and 
unimpeded choices (Berlin 1958: 7). “Positive liberty” requires more 
than just not being disturbed or let alone by others, however; it means 
“self-mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided against himself” 
(Berlin 1958: 19)—I am positively free to the degree to which I achieve 
self-mastery, which is the rule of my better parts over my worse.
According to Pettit, the prevalence of Berlin’s distinction obscured 
the philosophical validity and historical reality of a third understand-
ing of liberty: the republican concept of liberty as non-domination. This 
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understanding defi nes liberty also as absence, but as the absence of 
mastery or domination. The republican understanding is, so to speak, 
located in the middle between Berlin’s alternative because it combines 
the focus on absence with the focus on mastery or domination. Pettit 
illustrates his comprehension of mastery and liberty with the relation 
of master and slave. The intellectual roots of this comprehension hark 
back to Roman thought (Wirszubski 1950).
The Romans conceived of the good of liberty (libertas) as the op-
posite of the unfree state of the slave (dominatio, servitus) who was 
subjected to his master (dominus). In the extreme case, the relation of 
master and slave means that the one who rules can interfere on an ar-
bitrary basis with the choices of the other. Liberty as non-domination, 
however, equates to a state in which a person is more or less immune 
against the arbitrary interference of other persons. At the level of poli-
tics, this requires a political order that protects all citizens from the ar-
bitrary interference of the powerful citizens and thus from domination. 
This is the republican ideal of social and political liberty (Pettit 1997: 
vii–viii, 22, 24, 27). Both of the republican ideas of a mixed constitution 
and of a contestatory citizenry serve to realize and to secure this ideal 
of freedom for all citizens.
In On the People’s Terms, published in 2012, Pettit presents a re-
publican theory of social justice. Like a republican state, such a theory 
has to be “substantively” and “expressively egalitarian,” and thus has 
to treat all citizens as equals (Pettit 2012: 81, 88, 297). In this context, 
Pettit refers to the egalitarian debate on the “Equality of What?” that 
has been ongoing for some decades. Should there be equality of income, 
of resources, of welfare, of rights, of capabilities to perform certain hu-
man functions or of some other aspect? (Pettit 2012: 77–81, 297).7 Like 
other egalitarians, Pettit singles out one form of equality that he con-
siders to be the most relevant. His republican understanding of social 
justice aims at a society in which all citizens equally enjoy the status 
of being a free citizen. The concept of liberty that constitutes the re-
publican ideal of “equal status freedom” defi nes liberty as the stable 
absence of domination: “A republican theory of justice would seek the 
expressive equalization of freedom as non-domination: the promotion 
of freedom as non-domination is the basis of an equal concern for each 
citizen” (Pettit 2012: 297, 123; cf. 298).
The realization of the republican understanding of social justice re-
quires social institutions that safeguard equal liberty for all citizens. 
Such institutions comprise the provision of public resources for citizens, 
a high level of social security, and laws and norms. Pettit compares 
such institutions with antibodies in the bloodstream: just as antibod-
7 Cf. footnote 2. Sen explains: “While the question ‘why equality?’ is by no means 
dismissible, it is not the central issue that differentiates the standard theories, since 
they are all egalitarian in terms of some focal variable. The engaging question turns 
out to be ‘equality of what?’” (Sen 1992: 4. For an overview of the debate on Equality 
of what? cf. Cohen 1989).
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ies relate to the immunity against certain diseases, so do institutions 
safeguard citizens from domination (Pettit 2012: 123–24, 128, 297–99). 
In order to determine “what level of support is suffi cient” to effi ciently 
render citizens immune to domination, Pettit introduces “the eyeball-
test”: “They can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or 
deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk 
tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being 
equal in this respect with the best” (Pettit 2012: 84). Citizens enjoy 
enough resources and safeguards if their extent is suffi cient to pass 
the eyeball-test. For Pettit, a just and legitimate political order that 
meets the requirements of the republican ideal has to aim at a state 
that equally protects all citizens from domination and thus realizes 
their equal liberty.8
3. Liberty or Domination?
The concept of liberty plays a central role in John Rawls’s conception of 
justice as fairness. His fi rst principle of justice, which Rawls gives pri-
ority over the second, calls for equal liberties: “Each person is to have 
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liber-
ties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” (Rawls 1971: 
302). By “equal basic liberties,” Rawls means classical individual or 
civil rights like liberty of conscience and freedom of thought and free-
dom of speech and assembly, as well as the democratic political rights 
of citizens to vote and to stand for public offi ce (Rawls 1971: 61).
In Spheres of Justice, Walzer shows little interest in liberty in the 
sense of civil rights and liberties. This runs contrary to the approach 
of his previous book on Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer 2006),9 as well 
as to Rawls’s conception of justice. Walzer even considers the two most 
basic rights: not to be robbed of life or of liberty, “only of limited help 
in thinking about distributive justice” (Walzer 1983: xv). However, he 
declares that the kind of egalitarianism he is arguing for in his book “is 
consistent with liberty” (Walzer 1983: xiv). But what does Walzer mean 
by the liberty he associates with his political egalitarianism? A crucial 
quotation from the Preface of Spheres makes clear that Walzer has the 
same understanding of liberty as Skinner and Pettit:
The aim of political egalitarianism is a society free from domination. This is 
the lively hope named by the word equality: no more bowing and scraping, 
8 Contrary to Rawls in A Theory of Justice, Pettit distinguishes between the 
terms “social justice” and “political legitimacy”. While social justice concerns the 
relations between people within the state, political legitimacy concerns the relations 
between “citizens as a whole and the state itself” (Pettit 2012: 130, 75).
9 In Spheres, Walzer states in retrospect: “Some years ago, when I wrote about 
war, I relied heavily on the idea of rights. For the theory of justice in war can 
indeed be generated from the two most basic and widely recognized rights of human 
beings—and in their simplest (negative) form: not to be robbed of life or of liberty” 
(Walzer 1983: xv).
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fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high-and-might-
iness; no more masters, no more slaves. It is not a hope for the elimination 
of differences; we don’t all have to be the same or have the same amounts of 
the same thing. Men and women are one another’s equals (for all important 
moral and political purposes) when no one possesses or controls the means 
of domination. But the means of domination are differently constituted in 
different societies. Birth and blood, landed wealth, capital, education, di-
vine grace, state power–all these have served at one time or another to en-
able some people to dominate others. Domination is always mediated by 
some set of social goods. (Walzer 1983: xiii, Walzer’s italics)
The political egalitarianism Walzer is advocating doesn’t aim at equal-
izing the unequal or giving everyone equal shares of some good. The 
kind of equality he strives for is a form of equality he characterizes as 
“free from every sort of domination” (Walzer 1983: xv). For Walzer, a 
society free from domination and subordination is not only a free soci-
ety but also a society of equals. In such a society, citizens are equal in 
the sense that they are equally free from domination. Such a society 
would pass Pettit’s eyeball-test because its citizens can indeed “walk 
tall” and “look others in the eye.” For Walzer, a society in which all citi-
zens are equally free from domination is also a just society. This is the 
central idea of the political philosophy he lays out in Spheres.
From Walzer’s perspective, freedom and liberty are concepts op-
posed to “domination” and “dominance”: a free society is a society free 
from domination and dominance. As such, these are key concepts in 
Walzer’s theory of justice. For him, “dominance” is “the central issue 
in distributive justice” (Walzer 1983: 16). But what does Walzer mean 
exactly by the terms “dominance” and “domination,” and how does he 
distinguish the two? Domination is, as quoted, “always mediated by 
some set of social goods,” so insofar as these goods are dominant, they 
can serve as a means for domination. In our contemporary society, the 
main dominant social goods are money or capital, which are convert-
ible into other social goods like an excellent education, recognition or 
political power and allow the rich to dominate the poor (Walzer 1983: 
22, 315).
Walzer defi nes a dominant good in the following way: “I call a good 
dominant if the individuals who have it, because they have it, can com-
mand a wide range of other goods” (Walzer 1983: 10)10 a dominant good 
is easily converted into another good or into many others (Walzer 1983: 
11). This illustrates why people try to accumulate dominant goods, like 
money. The central problem with dominance and dominant goods for 
Walzer is that “the dominance of goods makes for the domination of 
10 Walzer goes on to say about the dominant good: “It is monopolized whenever a 
single man or woman, a monarch in the world of value–or a group of men and women, 
oligarchs–successfully hold it against all rivals” (Walzer 1983: 10–11). Walzer’s term 
of a monopoly of social goods is somewhat misleading as in most societies it is rarely 
only one person who owns or controls some sort of social good.
M. Knoll, Michael Walzer’s Republican Theory of Distributive Justice 89
people” (Walzer 1983: 19). Domination of people and its social prereq-
uisite, the dominance of goods, is what Walzer considers to be unjust.
Of course, the problem of an unequal distribution of goods has of-
ten been addressed by the prevailing egalitarian political philosophers. 
In Walzer’s terminology, these philosophers advocate “simple equal-
ity.” Simple equality means numeric or arithmetic equality, which is 
realised if I have the same amount of a good as you do (Walzer 1983: 
13–17).11 Simple egalitarians hold that an unequal possession of the 
dominant good or the dominant goods is unjust. As a consequence, they 
advocate a more equal distribution and thus a redistribution of goods. 
The goal for these egalitarians is to establish simple equality, which is 
their understanding of a just distribution. The problem is only which 
kind of equality should be established.12
Walzer has a highly critical attitude of the concept of simple equal-
ity. He argues that a “regime of simple equality won’t last for long” 
and “would require continual state intervention” (Walzer 1983: 14–15). 
Furthermore, simple equality is an extremely reductionist approach 
that is quite inappropriate for the plurality and complexity of our 
distributive systems and their issues. In Spheres, therefore, Walzer 
doesn’t focus on how to get rid of simple inequalities but attends to pos-
sible ways and solutions to reduce dominance. The central claim of his 
theory of justice is that “the way should be opened for the autonomous 
distribution of all social goods: this amounts to saying that dominance 
is unjust” (Walzer 1983: 13). Walzer’s goal is a society in which this 
“autonomous distribution” of all social goods is enforced, which, so he 
claims, prevents dominance.
4. Autonomous Distributions and Complex Equality 
For Walzer, it is a fact that social goods tend to have different mean-
ings in different societies. The claim of his interpretative method is 
that the proper distributive criteria of social goods are intrinsic to each 
particular social good. It is the meaning of each social good that de-
termines the criterion of its just distribution.13 Walzer argues, for ex-
ample, that the appropriate understanding of the meaning of medical 
care and welfare reveals to us that these goods should not be sold but 
allocated according to need (Walzer 1983: 64–91).
The consequence of Walzer’s claim that the meaning of each social 
good determines its criterion of just distribution is that each social good 
and its distinct meaning constitutes—as he puts it metaphorically—a 
11 The concept of simple equality as numeric or arithmetic equality goes back to 
Plato and Aristotle (Aristotle, Politics, V 1 1301b 29–34; Plato, Laws, VI 757). Cf. the 
concept of simple equality Miller (1995b: 197–202). 
12 As mentioned previously, among egalitarians there has been a vivid debate 
going on about the crucial question: Equality of What?
13 Cf. for the diffi culties of Walzer’s claim that the meaning of each social good 
determines its criterion of just distribution Miller (1995a: 1–16, especially 5–10).
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separate and relatively autonomous sphere of justice: “When meanings 
are distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every social good or 
set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which 
only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate” (Walzer 1983: 
10). In the case of medical care and welfare in general, these constitute 
a sphere in which the proper criterion for a just distribution is need. 
Public honour, on the other hand, constitutes a sphere in which the 
criterion is merit or desert, while offi ce constitutes a sphere in which 
the suitable criterion is qualifi cation (Walzer 1983: 135–139, 143–147, 
259–262). And it is the distribution of these social goods according to 
their appropriate criteria that makes the distribution autonomous. 
Walzer is aware, though, that there is no absolute autonomy of the 
spheres but only a relative one, because what “happens in one distribu-
tive sphere affects what happens in the others” (Walzer 1983: 10). The 
autonomy is internal to the spheres, not in the system of their external, 
inter-sphere relations.
Contrary to an autonomous distribution, the allocation of medi-
cal care, public honour or offi ces to people who possess the dominant 
good of money means an “invasion” of these spheres and a violation 
of their inherent criteria: “Dominance describes a way of using social 
goods that isn’t limited by their intrinsic meanings or that shapes those 
meanings to its own image” (Walzer 1983: 10–11). For Walzer, the lat-
ter equals a false interpretation and an overpowering of meaning. The 
result of Walzer’s refl ections on social goods and distribution is a gen-
eral distributive principle which reads as follows:
The critique of dominance and domination points toward an open-ended 
distributive principle. No social good x should be distributed to men and 
women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and 
without regard to the meaning of x. (Walzer 1983: 20, Walzer’s italics) 
Thus, in this formulation, the good y is a dominant good, and domi-
nance would be to distribute x to people merely because they possess 
that dominant good y.14
In the preface of the German edition of his work on distributive jus-
tice, Walzer emphasizes that he holds the idea of complex equality to be 
the most interesting one of the book (Walzer 1992: 11). But again, what 
does “complex equality” mean exactly? Are there any good reasons to 
characterize Walzer’s conception of just distributions as egalitarian in 
the sense of aiming at equality at all? If public honour is distributed 
according to desert or merit, for example, and welfare “in proportion 
to need,” these distributions will lead to unequal results (Walzer 1983: 
84). The same is true for higher education which, contrary to basic edu-
cation, is to be distributed according to the criteria of interest and ca-
14 Indeed, according to Walzer there are three criteria for the distribution of 
goods that “meet the requirements of the open-ended principle”: Free exchange, 
desert, and need (Walzer 1983: 21). Walzer claims “that every criterion that has any 
force at all meets the general rule within its own sphere, and not elsewhere” (Walzer 
1983: 26). Cf. the problems of this claim Haus 2000, Den Hartogh 1999.
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pacity (Walzer 1983: 203, 206). And even in the sphere of democratic 
politics Walzer sees no problem with an unequal distribution of politi-
cal power.15
Walzer’s idea of complex equality is his alternative to the notion of 
simple equality, for which egalitarians usually argue. What he means 
by complex equality is phrased in a central passage of his book:
The regime of complex equality is the opposite of tyranny. It establishes a set 
of relationships such that domination is impossible. In formal terms, com-
plex equality means that no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard 
to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, 
with regard to some other good. Thus, citizen X may be chosen over citizen 
Y for political offi ce, and then the two of them will be unequal in the sphere 
of politics. But they will not be unequal generally so long as X’s offi ce gives 
him no advantages over Y in any other sphere–superior medical care, access 
to better schools for his children, entrepreneurial opportunities, and so on. 
So long as offi ce is not a dominant good, is not generally convertible, offi ce 
holders will stand, or at least can stand, in a relation of equality to the men 
and women they govern. (Walzer 1983: 19–20, all italics by M. K.)
The opposition of the regime of complex equality to tyranny is crucial 
for an adequate understanding of Walzer’s idea of complex equality—
as indicated by the title of the fi nal chapter of his book on distributive 
justice: Tyrannies and Just Societies. While Walzer holds a tyrannical 
society to be an unjust society, he regards a “complex egalitarian soci-
ety” to be a just society.
Although Walzer uses the term “tyranny” in Spheres in a wide sense, 
he is well aware that the “immediate connotations of the word tyrant 
are political; its pejorative sense derives from centuries of oppression 
by chiefs and kings—and, more recently, by generals and dictators” 
(Walzer 1983: 282, Walzer’s italics). For Walzer, in fact, every usage of 
political power that aims at getting access to goods from other spheres 
is tyrannical. Like dominance, tyranny in the most general sense com-
prises a disregard for the principles of justice internal to each distribu-
tive sphere and an aggressive entry so as to “invade” these spheres 
(Walzer 1983: 19, 315; cf. 10–11, 59). However, the original meaning of 
tyranny as an illegitimate and arbitrary rule over people is also cen-
tral for Walzer’s theory of justice. This connects him with republican-
ism, for which tyranny is the analogy of the rule of a master over a 
slave that has to be avoided by all means (cf. Saracino 2012). Analo-
gously, Walzer’s political theory in Spheres is a critique of tyrannical 
and therefore illegitimate and arbitrary rule that goes along with the 
domination of people and severe inequality and injustice. Indeed, one of 
his most important insights in Spheres is that an illegitimate rule over 
15 Although he admits that everyone should have the right to “exercise minimal 
power” through the right to vote, he understands democratic politics as “a monopoly 
of politicians” and declares: “Democracy puts a premium on speech, persuasion, 
rhetorical skill. Ideally, the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument–that 
is, the argument that actually persuades the largest number of citizens–gets his 
way” (Walzer 1983: 309, 304; cf. 305).
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goods is connected to an illegitimate rule over people. The latter can be 
derived from the former: “In political life—but more widely, too—the 
dominance of goods makes for the domination of people” (Walzer 1983: 
19).
In a just society, inequalities within each sphere and even the mo-
nopolization of goods in one sphere are not necessarily inappropriate; 
different people succeed in different spheres, but there is no ruling 
class or all-round winner. Dominance and tyranny, on the other hand, 
are inimical to justice. In a complex egalitarian society, there is no 
dominant good that is convertible into other social goods and any con-
vertibility is strictly limited. The people who hold political power guard 
the boundaries of the spheres and prevent powerful men and women 
from violating the appropriate standards of distribution and from “in-
vading” the other spheres: “But we can only talk of a regime of complex 
equality when there are many boundaries to defend; and what the right 
number is cannot be specifi ed” (Walzer 1983: 10, 28, Walzer’s italics). 
Because in a complex egalitarian society no one possesses or controls 
the means of domination, it is a society free of tyranny, domination and 
subordination.
5. Complex Equality as Simple Equality of Liberty
In the literature, there is a controversy concerning the question of 
whether Walzer is a political egalitarian who tries to save the concept 
of equality by its reinterpretation or whether he is a non-egalitarian 
and a critic of the ideal of equality, as Angelika Krebs claims (Den 
Hartogh 1999, Haus 2012, 2014, Krebs 2012). Obviously, Walzer him-
self contributed to this disagreement because he criticizes the ideal of 
simple equality and yet advocates complex equality and gave his book 
the subtitle A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. This raises an essen-
tial question: what exactly does the term “equality” mean in Walzer’s 
notion of a complex equality, or, what kind of equality is Walzer advo-
cating with his call for its complex form?
Michael Haus distinguishes four egalitarian aspects in Walzer’s 
theory of justice that clarify the intuition on which the conception of 
complex equality is based: equality as equal opportunities, equality 
through compensations (citizens “lose” in some spheres and “win” in 
others), equality as equal worth of all citizens (autonomous distribu-
tions allow no general ranking in society), and an equality of member-
ship or citizenship in the political community (Haus 2000: 254–261, 
2014: 40–44). Another interpretation is given by David Miller in his 
essay on “Complex Equality” in a volume of essays he edited together 
with Michael Walzer on Spheres. As Miller points out, we should look 
at complex equality “arising as a by-product of many separate distribu-
tions, each of which is in itself inegalitarian […]. So here equality does 
not refer to the way some identifi able good is distributed, but describes 
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the overall character of a set of social relationships” (Miller 1995b: 
198–199).16
According to Miller, therefore, “an overarching equality of status” is 
the “best interpretation” of complex social equality: “In a society which 
realizes complex equality, people enjoy a basic equality of status which 
overrides their unequal standing in particular spheres of justice such 
as money and power” (Miller 1995b: 199, 206). In equality of status, 
equal citizenship plays a cardinal role. All citizens are “enjoying an 
equal status qua citizens” (Miller 1995b: 206). According to Walzer, 
membership in some human community is the “primary good that we 
distribute to one another” (Walzer 1983: 31). Although the members 
of a community have the right to politically determine who they want 
to admit, they are morally constrained by the principle of mutual aid. 
Even more important, everyone who is admitted as a new immigrant, 
as a refugee or as a resident or worker “must be offered the opportuni-
ties of citizenship” (Walzer 1983: 62).
In his interpretation of complex equality as equality of status or 
equality of citizenship, Miller declares that the term “equality” should 
not be understood as a form of simple equality.17 However, the “kind of 
equality” manifested in the overall relationship of people in a complex 
egalitarian society has to be understood exactly as that. For Walzer, 
simple equality “is a simple distributive condition, so that if I have 
fourteen hats and you have fourteen hats, we are equal” (Walzer 1983: 
18). By this defi nition, in a distribution of membership or status, all 
citizens are equal if they all have the same status of citizenship. In his 
reply to the critique of the egalitarian Richard Arneson, Walzer makes 
it clear that complex equality also appeals and goes back to simple 
equality: “complex equality is a version of equality; the adjective quali-
fi es the noun, it doesn’t replace it” (Walzer 1995: 283, cf. Arneson 1995: 
249–250, Walzer 2014: 9–14). In a complex egalitarian society people 
will be “in fact more equal, on some measure, then they are now” (Wal-
zer 1995: 283).
For Walzer, the crucial measure, that on which people in a complex 
egalitarian society would be more equal, is freedom as non-domination. 
In his reply to Arneson, Walzer moves on to say that the egalitarianism 
of complex equality is “manifest in a radical decline of the dominance 
of some people over others” (Walzer 1995: 283). Such dominance—or, 
16 From a perspective of complex equality, equality is not conceived as a “Zustand 
der Gleichverteilung bestimmter Güter, sondern als eine übergreifende Eigenschaft 
des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens” (Haus 2003: 177).
17 Miller interprets “Walzer’s overarching notion of complex equality” as “the 
idea that in a society in which different people succeed in different spheres, their 
relationships overall can manifest a certain kind of equality. This is not simple 
equality, the sort that might obtain if people had equal amounts of property, or 
income. It is equality that comes about through many separate inequalities, 
cancelling or offsetting one another in such a way that no one can be picked out as 
an all-round winner” (Miller 1995a: 12).
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more precisely, and as Walzer usually expresses it—such domina-
tion is “always mediated by some set of social goods”. Since the main 
dominant social good in contemporary societies is money, its exchange 
into other goods like education, welfare or political power has to be 
blocked (see Walzer’s list of all blocked exchanges Walzer 1983: 100–
103). These are all goods that money should not be able to buy. How 
closely Walzer links the two concepts “equality” and “liberty” shows 
his conviction, that “it isn’t only equality but freedom, too, that we de-
fend when we block a large number of (the larger number of) possible 
exchanges” (Walzer 1983: 317). As a formula: the less dominance of 
goods, the less domination of people over others and the more liberty, 
equality and justice. The most fundamental form of simple equality 
that is brought about in a society that achieves complex equality is not 
equality of status defi ned as equality of membership. On the contrary, 
the most crucial form of simple equality that Walzer anticipates as the 
result of autonomous distributions, and thus, of a complex egalitarian 
society, is equality of liberty or freedom, or, as Pettit puts it, “equal 
status freedom.”
In the preface to Spheres, Walzer understands his “entire book” as 
“an answer of a complicated sort” to the question: “In what respects are 
we one another’s equals?” (Walzer 1983: xii). His most fundamental an-
swer to this question is: “Men and women are one another’s equals (for 
all important moral and political purposes) when no one possesses or 
controls the means of domination” (Walzer 1983: xiii). People are most 
importantly one another’s equals insofar as they are equally “free from 
every sort of domination” (Walzer 1983: xv, cf. 317). As, in a complex 
egalitarian society, everyone is equally free from domination, tyranny 
and subordination, complex equality should be interpreted primarily 
as simple equality of freedom or liberty. Thus a just and pluralistic 
society is also an equal and free society or a society of free and equal 
citizens. The concept of liberty and equality achieved by Walzer’s com-
plex egalitarian society is primarily negative: it means the absence of 
tyranny or non-domination. This conception of liberty is the one that 
prevails in contemporary republican political thought.
Conclusion
Despite Walzer’s critique of simple equality, in the end his theory of 
justice aims primarily at simple equality of liberty or freedom. Though 
the “product of autonomous distributions” is, as Walzer declares, “com-
plex equality,” it is also a simple equality of liberty or freedom (Wal-
zer 1995: 283). However, this does not mean that Walzer contradicts 
himself or that his theory of justice is inconsistent. Although the state 
of equal freedom from domination is an essential feature of a complex 
egalitarian society, citizens in such a democratic society are equal and 
unequal in many different respects. They have unequal amounts of 
most social goods, inevitably, but they have “a single political status” 
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and there will be “equality of membership” (Walzer 1983: 62, 84). In 
order to ensure equal membership and avoid the exclusion of citizens, 
there is an equal basic education, an equal right to vote, “equal rights” 
in general, and suchlike (Walzer 1983: 202–203, 206, 305–306, 309). 
All these forms of equality are forms of simple equality, and, combined, 
they constitute complex equality or features of a complex egalitarian 
society. However, simple equality of liberty or freedom is the most im-
portant trait of such a democratic society.
Walzer criticizes political and theoretical approaches that aim at 
establishing simple equality by redistributing the dominant good for 
being reductionist and unstable. Certainly, the fi rst of these two criti-
cisms does not apply to a complex egalitarian society, in which all social 
goods are distributed according to their respective social meanings. Re-
garding the second, Walzer confesses that complex equality would not 
“necessarily be more stable than simple equality” (Walzer 1983: 17). 
His third criticism of a regime of simple equality is that it “would re-
quire continual state intervention” (Walzer 1983: 15). Although Walzer 
conceives of the state as the appropriate setting or framework of his 
whole theory of justice, however, he denies that this criticism applies 
to a complex egalitarian society (Walzer 1983: 28–30). He claims that, 
in such a society, “resistance to convertibility would be maintained, in 
large degree, by ordinary men and women within their own spheres 
of competence and control, without large-scale state action” (Walzer 
1983: 17). However, he contradicts this claim by saying that it is politi-
cal power that “is used to defend the boundaries of all the distributive 
spheres, including its own, and to enforce the common understand-
ings of what goods are and what they are for” (Walzer 1983: 15 fn., 
281).18 Nevertheless, Walzer admits that political power can be used 
“to invade the different spheres and to override those understandings” 
(Walzer 1983: 15 fn.).
Although Walzer devotes a long chapter of Spheres to political pow-
er, he does not explain how offi ce holders can be prevented from invad-
ing the different spheres. There is another serious problem that Walzer 
does not address. Even if all goods were distributed according to their 
social meanings, the people who hold political power could still possess 
the power to interfere in the affairs of the citizens they govern on an 
arbitrary basis. These two problems represent a blind spot of Walzer’s 
theory of justice: essentially, it offers elements of a theory of democracy 
but no theory of government. Pettit’s neo-republicanism, however, is 
able to fi x this shortcoming. As the subtitle of Pettit’s book Rebublican-
ism indicates, he offers not only a theory of freedom but of government 
(Pettit 1997). Pettit’s version of republicanism devotes considerable at-
tention to the question of how to check the government or the people 
18 For Walzer, political power is “probably the most important, and certainly 
the most dangerous, good in human history” (Walzer 1983: 15). Cf. the chapter on 
political power (Walzer 1983: 281–311).
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who hold political power. For him, a contestatory citizenry and a func-
tioning mixed constitution can protect all citizens from domination.
However, Pettit’s neo-republicanism has its own blind spot. Like 
Skinner, Pettit conceives of domination primarily as a direct relation 
among people. Domination can occur in the workplace and in the fam-
ily as domination between private individuals. However, domination 
is also mediated through political institutions. Government power is 
supposed to be a remedy for the domination between private individu-
als, but can lead to a new form of domination that occurs between the 
holders of political power and the people they govern. Although Pettit 
is right to conceive of domination as a direct relation among people, he 
neglects to consider the fact that domination is usually also mediated 
through social goods. Contrary to Walzer, Pettit has no theory of social 
goods. It is a main strength of Walzer’s theory that it focuses on the 
different social goods through which domination is mediated and that 
he is able to demonstrate that dominant goods serve as a means for 
the domination of people. Therefore, Walzer’s theory is able to fi x an 
important shortcoming of Pettit’s theory. As a result, Pettit and Walzer 
pick out different means and ways how to reach the republican goal at 
which they both aim at, the freedom of citizens from domination; each 
succeeds in a place where the other fails, and so, their two republican 
theories should be viewed as allies that complement each other.
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